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Abstract
This paper uses a new dataset on the composition of public debt in developing and emerging 
market countries to look at the correlation between country characteristics and domestic debt 
share.  While the paper finds that most variables have the expected sign, it also finds that country 
characteristics cannot explain regional differences in the composition of public debt. Moreover, 
the paper finds a weak correlation between inflationary history and the composition of public debt. 
The paper explores the determinants of this finding and shows that the results are driven by the 
presence of capital controls. 
Keywords: Public debt, Government bond markets, Debt structure, Sovereign bonds
JEL Codes: F21, F34, F36, G15
*  Forlsund (kristine.forslund@unctad.org) and Panizza (ugo.panizza@untad.org) are with the Debt and 
Finance Analysis Unit, DGDS, UNCTAD. Lima (lycia    .lima@econ.puc-rio.br    ) is with the Department of 
Economics of PUC, Rio de Janerio. All the opinions expressed in this paper are the authors' and should not 
be attributed to any organization they are or have been affiliated with. The usual caveats apply.1. Introduction
The objective of this paper is to document recent trends in the composition of public debt 
across a large sample of developing and emerging market countries and test whether there 
are empirical regularities that explain the choice between domestic and external public 
debt. Our analysis yields two surprising results. First, contrary to what is found by several 
studies on the determinants of bond market development in emerging market countries, we 
find that our large set of control variables plays a limited role in explaining cross-country 
differences in the composition of public debt. Second, we find that inflationary history has 
no statistically significant effect on the composition of public debt. In particular, we do not 
find evidence that countries with a history of high inflation have lower shares of 
domestically issued debt. When we look carefully at this latter result, we find that it is 
driven by the presence of capital controls. We show that in countries with high levels of 
capital controls there is no statistically significant correlation between domestic debt share 
and inflationary history. However, in countries with low and intermediate levels of capital 
controls, we find that inflationary history has a negative and statistically significant impact 
on domestic debt share. This suggests that capital controls have a negative effect on the 
development of the domestic debt market in countries characterized by high policy 
credibility but may help developing the domestic bond market in countries characterized by 
low policy credibility.
1 
We are not the first to study the determinants of debt composition in developing 
and emerging countries. However, previous research focused on bonded debt and restricted 
the analysis to the 27 emerging market countries covered by the Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS) survey on domestic securities. To the best of our knowledge, our paper 
is the first that covers a large sample of countries. Four papers that are closely related to 
our work are Burger and Warnock (2006), Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler (2007), 
Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004), and Borensztein, Cowan, Eichengreen, and 
Panizza (2008). 
Burger and Warnock (2006) were the first to use BIS data on domestic securities to 
study the determinants of local bond market development (they use both private and public 
sector bonds). Their sample covers up to 49 countries and includes 27 emerging market 
1 Of course this positive effect is likely to vanish if countries that impose capital controls continue to adopt 
irresponsible policies. However, in countries that are seriously committed to improve policy credibility, 
capital controls can be considered as an additional policy instruments in building a local debt market.  For a 
discussion of financial repressions see Reinhart and Sbrancia (2011)
2countries and 22 advanced economies.  The main findings of Burger and Warnock are that 
policies and institutions play an important role in the development of the local government 
bond market. In particular, they find that low inflation, rule of law, and country size are 
positively correlated with the development of the domestic government bond market and 
that the fiscal balance and GDP growth are negatively correlated with the size of the 
government bond market. 
While Burger and Warnock work with cross-sectional data, Claessens, Klingebiel, 
and Schmukler (2007) use panel data to study the determinants of the development of the 
market for local currency government bonds. Their sample (which is also based on BIS 
data) covers up to 36 countries (of which 12 are emerging markets and the remaining are 
advanced economies) for the 1993-2000 period. Their results are consistent with those of 
Burger and Warnock (2006). In particular, they find that country size, size of the banking 
system (as measured by total deposits over GDP), good institutions, low inflation, flexible 
exchange rates, and fiscal burden are positively correlated with the size of the domestic 
bond market. In addition, they find that countries with flexible exchange rates tend to have 
larger domestic bond markets. 
Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) also use panel data techniques and BIS 
data to study the determinants of domestic bond market capitalization in 41 countries over 
the period 1990-2001 (they do not restrict their analysis to government bonds and include 
all  types  of issuers).   Compared to Claessens, Klingebiel,  and Schmukler (2007), 
Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) use a larger set of controls and confirm the 
finding that country size and institutional quality are positively associated with the 
development of the domestic  bond market. Contrary to Claessens, Klingebiel,  and 
Schmukler (2007), however, Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) find that lower 
exchange rate volatility is positively correlated with the size of the domestic bond market 
and argue that this might be due to the fact that a fixed exchange rate lowers currency risk 
and may encourage foreign participation. They also find that countries without capital 
controls tend to have larger bond markets. 
Borensztein, Cowan, Eichengreen, and Panizza (2008) build upon Eichengreen and 
Luengnaruemitchai   (2004)   but   expand   their   sample   and   distinguish   between   the 
determinants of the development of markets in government, corporate and financial sector 
bonds, rather than considering the bond market as a single aggregate. Moreover, their 
analysis   uses   a   difference-in-differences   methodology   suitable   for   identifying   the 
differential effects of country characteristics on the development of different segments of 
3the bond market. Finally, they run separate regressions for emerging markets.  In line with 
previous studies, Borensztein, Cowan, Eichengreen, and Panizza (2008) find that country 
size is significantly correlated with the size of bond market but that the relationship is non-
linear. In addition, they find that bond market development is positively correlated with 
trade openness, total public debt, institutional quality, lack of capital controls, and the 
privatization of the pension system.  With respect to interest rates, they find that the level 
of the domestic interest rate is negatively correlated with market capitalization but that 
there is no significant correlation between banking spreads and the size of the government 
bond market. When they focus on a sub-sample of 21 emerging market countries, 
Borensztein et al. (2008) find that country size no longer appears to matter and that the 
positive effect of public debt becomes much smaller.
There are three differences between our paper and the four papers discussed above. 
The first difference relates to the definition of public debt. The previous papers focused on 
bond market development while we focus on total public debt. 
The second difference is in regard to country coverage. The papers discussed above 
examine a relatively small group of emerging market countries, whereas our paper covers 
up 95 developing countries, of which 33 are low-income countries. Moreover, the analysis 
of the previous papers jointly included developing and industrial countries (with the partial 
exception of Borensztein, Cowan, Eichengreen, and Panizza 2008) and one may suspect 
that most of the variance in bond market development was driven by the difference 
between these two groups of countries. Accordingly we address this issue in this paper by 
focusing exclusively on developing countries.
The third difference relates to the methodology. While previous studies either 
focused on cross-country differences (Burger and Warnock, 2006) or jointly looked at 
cross-country and within countries differences, our battery of statistical tests also use fixed 
effect estimations which allows for isolation of the determinants of changes within 
countries. 
2 Data and trends
Lack of reliable data has been the main obstacle to the analysis of the composition of 
public debt in developing countries. In this paper, we use a new public debt dataset 
(assembled by Panizza, 2008) which  aims to capture both the domestic and external 
component of public debt. This new dataset consists of an unbalanced panel of 1558 
4observations covering 104 developing countries for the 1990-2007 period (Table 1 shows 
the coverage of the dataset by year and region).
2 In the remainder of this paper we use a 
subset of the original dataset based on an almost balanced panel that covers developing 
countries for the 1994-2006 period. 
Trends
Domestic public debt is not a new phenomenon for developing countries. Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2008) collect data on domestic public debt for a large sample of countries going 
back to the 19
th century. Their sample shows that domestic debt accounts for almost two 
thirds of total public debt. They also show that the accumulation of a large domestic debt is 
often at the roots of external debt crisis and large inflationary episode.
3  In this paper we 
use the data assembled by Panizza (2008) which yielded lower but still substantial 
domestic debt share. The top panel of Table 2 shows that over the 1994-2005 period, 
domestic public debt to GDP increased slightly from 19 to 23 per cent for developing 
countries'. This trend occurred while average debt levels were decreasing from 75 to 64 per 
cent of developing countries' GDP. As a consequence, the share of domestic debt over total 
public debt increased from 30 to 40 per cent. The bottom panel of Table 2 reports weighted 
averages and shows that the switch to domestic borrowing is even more important in larger 
countries. In this case, the domestic debt-to-GDP ratio increased from 22 to 27 per cent, 
and the share of domestic debt over total debt increased from 48 to 69 percent.
Figure 1 plots the evolution of public debt in the developing world and shows a net 
decrease in total debt which is mostly driven by lower external debt. Figure 2 shows the 
evolution of the simple average of the share of domestic debt over total debt across 6 
regions
4. In general, the share of domestic debt increased in most regions of the world. 
Only in Sub-Saharan Africa did the share of domestic debt decrease slightly from 1999-
2005, but also in this region domestic debt went from 25 per cent of total public debt in 
1994 to 30 per cent in 2005. 
2  Most of the data refer to central government debt, but when central government debt data were not 
available, Panizza (2008) used data for the general government and the non-financial public sector.
3 Guidotti and Kumar (1991) study the case of 15 emerging market countries and show that their domestic 
public debt-to-GDP ratio went from 10 per cent in 1981 to 16 per cent in 1988. Christensen (2005) shows 
that low-income countries also have a tradition of domestic borrowing (in his sample of Sub-Saharan African 
countries, domestic public debt was about 10 per cent of GDP in 1980).
4 Regions are broken down by World Bank regional classifications, which includes: East Asia and Pacific 
(EAP);Europe and Central Asia (ECA); Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC); Middle East and Northern 
Africa (MNA); South Asia (SAS), Sub Saharan Africa (SSA).
5Table 3 reports summary statistics for the share of domestic debt to total debt. The 
top panel of the table presents the summary statistics for all available data, whereas the 
bottom panel presents the summary statistics for the observations used in the regressions of 
Section 3.   In comparing the two panels, by and large, the two samples have similar 
characteristics.
5  As already highlighted in Figure 2 and Table 2, the Middle East & 
Northern Africa, East Asia & Pacific, and Europe & Central Asia are the regions with the 
highest shares of domestic public debt while Latin America & the Caribbean and Sub-
Saharan Africa are the regions with the lowest shares of domestic debt. In examining 
income groups, we find that middle-income countries have an average domestic debt share 
of 37 per cent and low-income countries have a much lower domestic debt share of about 
20 per cent.  If we look across periods, we find that the share of domestic debt increased 
from 27 per cent in the first half of the 1990s to 35 per cent in the first six years of the 21
st 
century. 
3 The Determinants of Debt Composition
In this section, we estimate the determinants of public debt composition by regressing 
domestic public debt (measured as a share of total public debt) over a set of country 
characteristics. We estimate our model using both random effects and fixed effects models. 
We also test for differences across groups of countries by splitting the sample between 
low-income developing countries and middle-income developing countries. 
Our   control   variables   can   be   classified   into   five   different   categories:   (i) 
macroeconomic imbalances; (ii) country size and level of development; (iv) crises and 
external shocks; (v) openness; and (iv) exchange rate regime. The first category includes 
inflation, current account balance, government balance, total public debt and its square, and 
exchange rate misalignment. The second category includes GDP, GDP per capita, M2 over 
GDP, and corruption. The third category includes a banking crisis dummy, a sovereign 
default dummy, a dummy that captures sudden debt explosions, a dummy that captures 
sudden debt reductions, the growth rate of the real exchange rate, and a terms of trade 
index. The fourth category includes a measure of de facto trade openness and a measure of 
de jure capital account openness.
6  Finally, in all regressions we control for global factors 
5 The only differences are in the ECA and SAS regions and in the 2000-2006 sub-periods. In these three 
groups we find that the sub-samples included in the regressions have slightly higher domestic debt shares 
(with differences that range between 2 and 3 percentage points).  
6  We measure the exchange rate regime using the  de facto  indicators assembled by Levy Yeyati and 
6by including year fixed effects. In the random effects regressions we also include a set of 
regional dummies, where East Asia & Pacific is the excluded dummy.
Before describing our set of explanatory variables in greater detail, we should 
clarify that there are at least two caveats in our analysis. The first caveat concerns 
causality. Although we use lagged values of the explanatory variables and thus ensure that 
these are predetermined with respect to debt composition, we cannot make any strong 
claim that our estimations uncover a  causal  relationship going from the explanatory 
variables to debt composition. The second caveat relates to the fact that supply and demand 
effects often go in opposite directions. Thus, it is hard to have a clear prediction on the 
relationship between our explanatory and dependent variables.  Even with these caveats in 
mind, in some cases it should be possible to indicate which effects are expected to prevail 
and we will do so whenever possible. It is also important to acknowledge that even though 
our data can only distinguish between domestic and external debt and do not contain any 
information on currency composition, we will often justify our choice of explanatory 
variables using arguments based on currency composition. We do this because the share of 
domestic currency instruments in domestic debt is substantially higher than the domestic 
currency share of external debt, in fact the latter is often zero (see Eichengreen, Hausmann 
and  Panizza,  2005).  Thus,  place  of  issuance  is  often  a  good  proxy  for  currency 
composition, though this is not always the case (see Panizza, 2008). 
Our main measure of macroeconomic instability is log of inflation (Ln(INF)).
7 
There are two reasons why we expect a negative relationship between inflation and 
domestic debt share.
8 First, high inflation increases uncertainty which, other things equal, 
should increase the cost of issuing on the domestic market (unless all domestic debt is 
indexed to either prices or foreign currency).
9 Second, a government with a history of high 
inflation  may need to  issue foreign currency debt in  order to credibly  signal  its 
commitment to pursuing a strong and stable monetary policy (Calvo, 1988).  There are also 
mechanisms that may lead to a positive correlation between inflation and domestic debt 
share. Think, for instance, of a country that is facing a real appreciation (i.e., where 
Sturzenegger (2005) and use a dummy that takes value one in countries with a fixed exchange rate regime 
and a dummy that takes value one in counties with an intermediate exchange rate regime (floating exchange 
rate is the excluded dummy).
7 We use logs in order to be able to interpret the results as semi-elasticities. In order to deal with negative 
values we use the transformation LINF=Ln(1+INF)
8 Burger and Warnock (2006) and the other authors quoted in the introduction find that a history of high 
inflation is detrimental for the development of the domestic bond market. 
9  Even in this case, inflation can debase debt indexed to prices if the government tinkers with the price 
index. 
7inflation is higher than currency depreciation) and where a large share of domestic debt is 
indexed to inflation. In this case, valuation effects will create a positive link between 
inflation and domestic currency debt. We believe this to be a fairly exceptional case and so 
expect that, in the absence of financial repression, the first two effects will dominate the 
latter. In fact Burger and Warnock (2006) and the other authors quoted in the introduction 
all find a negative correlation between inflation and the development of the domestic bond 
market. 
The relationship between current account balance (CA/GDP) and domestic debt 
share should be straightforward because countries that are running a current account 
surplus do not need to borrow abroad. Hence, we expect a positive relationship between 
domestic debt share and current account balance. The relationship between domestic debt 
share and the government balance (GBAL/GDP) is uncertain. On the supply side, countries 
which are running large deficits and have limited access to the international capital market 
may need to issue more domestic debt. On the demand side, large deficits may lead to 
inflationary pressure (Sargent and Wallace, 1981), reduce credibility, and thus reduce the 
demand for domestic currency debt.  
The relationship between the level of debt (DEBT/GDP) and domestic debt share is 
also uncertain but we expect a positive and non-linear relationship between these two 
variables. Countries with a larger stock of debt will have more of an incentive to create the 
plumbing for a well-working market for domestic debt. However, when debt becomes too 
large, countries will have incentives to inflate away their debt obligations and this may 
have an adverse effect on the demand for domestic debt. 
Exchange rate misalignments (RER_MIS) also have opposite demand, supply, and 
valuation effects. On the demand side, at any given interest rate, a depreciated exchange 
rate vis-à-vis its equilibrium level is likely to foster the demand of domestic currency 
bonds as investors may foresee an ex-post deterioration of the foreign currency rate (a real 
appreciation of local currency). On the supply side, governments might be less likely to 
issue in domestic currency in presence of a depreciated exchange rate for the same reason 
why investors are interested in domestic bonds. Clearly, these considerations are valid for 
any given interest rates. However, if expectations on future movements of the exchange 
rate are symmetric, we should expect Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) to hold. In this case, 
the interest rate would adjust to equalize expected returns on domestic and foreign currency 
debt. Even if UIP holds, countries may find easier to issue domestic debt when the 
currency is appreciating because the expected appreciation allows prudent policymakers to 
8hide the implicit insurance premium embedded in domestic currency borrowing (Caballero 
and Cowan, 2006, Panizza, 2008). However, UIP does not normally hold in practice and 
activities such as carry trade can lead to a situation in which currency appreciation goes 
hand in hand with high interest rates. Finally, an appreciating exchange rate will 
automatically lead to higher domestic debt share through valuation effects. 
The expected signs for our second set of explanatory variables are unambiguous. In 
particular, we expect country size (measured by the log of total GDP, Ln(GDP), GDP per 
capita (Ln(GDP_PC), the size of the financial system (M2/GDP), and institutional quality 
(measured by lack of corruption, CORR) to be positively correlated with domestic debt 
share.
The effect of crises and external shocks is, instead, uncertain. Banking crises are 
often resolved by issuing domestic bonds. This suggests a positive correlation between the 
banking crisis dummy (BANKCRS) and the share of domestic debt. However, countries 
with a small financial sector may not be able to place domestically the large amount of debt 
which may be necessary to bail out the banking system. Thus, banking crises could be 
positively correlated with domestic debt share in middle-income countries with bigger 
financial sectors and negatively correlated with domestic debt share in low-income 
countries with smaller financial sectors. 
As countries in default are generally unable to place external debt, we should find a 
positive correlation between the default dummy (DEFAULT) and domestic debt share. 
However, as defaults are often preceded by large accumulations of external debt, it is 
possible that reverse causality will lead us to find a negative relationship between these two 
variables.  Sudden debt contractions are often driven by debt relief and debt rescheduling. 
Since most relief and rescheduling episodes relate to external debt, we expect a positive 
relationship between the debt contraction (DEBTCONTR) dummy and domestic debt 
share. Sudden debt explosions are often driven by valuation effects linked to currency 
depreciations (Campos, Jaimovich, Panizza, 2006) and by skeletons. The first effect would 
lead to a decrease in the domestic debt share and the second is usually associated with an 
increase in the domestic debt share, skeletons are often dealt with by issuing domestic 
bonds (see Fernandez, Pernice and Streb, 2008, for a discussion of the case of Argentina). 
As we are already controlling for the first effect by including the change of the real 
exchange rate (DRER), which we expect to be negatively correlated with domestic debt 
share), we expect to find that the debt explosion (DEBTEXPL) dummy is positively 
correlated with domestic debt share. As positive external shocks reduce the need of 
9external resources and hence we expect to find a positive correlation between terms of 
trade (DTOT) and domestic debt share.
Finally, we do not have clear expectations for the relationship between domestic 
debt share and the two measures of openness. Let us start with trade openness. On the one 
hand, more open countries suffer less from balance sheets effects associated with external 
borrowing (Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi, 2003) and thus we should expect a negative 
relationship between trade openness and domestic debt share. On the other hand, more 
open countries may be more successful in attracting foreign investors into the domestic 
financial market, bringing about a positive association between trade openness and 
domestic debt share. The first effect may be dominant in low-income countries whereas the 
second is likely to dominate in emerging markets.
10 In the case of financial openness we 
have a similar trade-off. On the one hand, financial repression may foster demand for 
domestic debt by creating a captive investor base (for a description of financial repression 
in a large sample of countries over a period of more than 100 years, see Reinhart and 
Sbrancia, 2011). On the other hand, such a policy prevents the participation of foreign 
investors in the domestic market. It is thus possible that financial repressions has a negative 
effect on the development of the domestic debt market in countries with high credibility 
and a positive effect in countries with low credibility. 
3.1 Results
We start by describing the results of a random effects model which can jointly capture 
cross-country and within country determinants of debt composition and then discuss what 
happens when we move to a fixed effects model. For each group of countries and 
estimation technique, we estimate the model using the full set of controls but also use a 
subset of controls which allows for a larger sample of countries. 
Random effects estimations
As expected, we find that in most regressions inflation has a negative coefficient, 
indicating that lack of monetary credibility is an obstacle to developing the market for 
10 This discussion does not fit the official definition of external debt because debt issued domestically but 
sold to foreign investors should be classified as external debt. However, few countries do this and usually 
they classify all debt issued on the domestic market as domestic debt (see Panizza, 2008 and Cowan, Levy 
Yeyati, Panizza, and Sturzenegger, 2006).
10domestic public debt (the exceptions are columns 1 and 5 of Table 4). However, we find 
that the coefficients are never statistically significant. This is surprising because one 
common finding of the existing literature is the presence of a strong and negative 
correlation between past inflation and the development of the domestic bond market.
11 In 
the next subsection we will investigate in greater detail why we do not find a statistically 
significant relationship between inflation and domestic debt share. 
As expected, the current account balance has always a positive  coefficient, 
indicating that countries that are running a current account surplus do not need to borrow 
abroad. However, as in the case of inflation, the coefficient is never statistically significant. 
We also find that the government balance has a negative coefficient. This is consistent with 
our hypothesis that developing countries tend to issue more domestic debt --relative to 
external debt-- when they have budgetary problems. But, again, the coefficient is not 
statistically significant. 
The relationship between domestic debt share and total public debt is non-linear 
and concave in the full sample and in the sub sample of middle-income countries, but 
convex and not statistically significant in the sub sample of low-income countries. A 
concave relationship between total public debt and domestic debt share is consistent with 
the hypothesis that, at lower levels of public debt, increases in the stock of debt have a 
positive impact over the share of domestic debt due to its role in developing the debt 
market. However, higher levels of debt may lead to sustainability problems and increase 
the incentives to inflate away the debt and thus reduce the demand for domestically issued 
debt.  It is worth noting that our point estimate suggests that the relationship between 
domestic debt share and total public debt only becomes negative when total public debt 
reaches 300 per cent of GDP (in column 1 of Table 4, the level of debt that maximizes the 
domestic debt share is 6.9/(2*1.061) = 3.27). 
The variable measuring the misalignment of the real exchange rate has a negative 
and statistically significant coefficient (except in low-income countries). Thus, we find that 
the share of domestic debt decreases when the real exchange rate is above its long-run 
trend. This fact is consistent with the presence of long-term currency misalignments which, 
in turn, may be sustained by speculative activities such as carry trade.
Focusing on the second group of variables, we find the expected results that country 
size and the level of development are positively correlated with domestic debt share. 
However, the coefficients are not always statistically significant. In particular, we find that, 
11  See Burger and Warnock (2006) and the other papers mentioned in the introduction. 
11on average, larger countries (as measured by total GDP) tend to have larger domestic debt 
shares, but this result does not hold for low-income countries. GDP per capita has a 
positive impact over domestic debt share and its coefficient is statistically (or close to 
being statistically significant) in most regressions. Our proxy for financial development, 
M2 over GDP, is positive in all cases but only significant in low-income countries.
12 In 
most cases, institutional quality (measured as lack of corruption) has a positive impact on 
domestic debt share but the coefficients are rarely statistically significant. 
The group of variables aimed at capturing crises and external shocks also give 
mixed results. The sovereign default and banking crisis dummies are rarely significant and 
switch sign across samples. However, we do find the expected result that low-income 
countries tend to finance banking crises by issuing external debt and middle-income 
countries finance banking crises by issuing more domestic debt. In the latter case, however, 
the coefficients are not even close to being statistically significant. With respect to the 
sovereign default dummy, we find that the coefficient is never statistically significant, a 
fact that is probably driven by reverse causality.   As expected, we find that currency 
depreciations have a negative effect on domestic debt share, indicating the presence of 
balance sheet effects. The effect is not significant in columns 2, 4, or 6. This may be due to 
the fact that in these columns we also control for exchange rate misalignments, a variable 
which is positively correlated with the change in the real exchange rate (DRER). 
The dummy variable capturing sudden debt contractions is negative and not 
statistically significant in the whole sample and in the sub sample of middle-income 
countries but is positive (and close to being statistically significant in column 3) in the sub 
sample of low-income countries. The results for low-income countries confirm our prior 
expectation that sudden debt contractions are driven by debt relief episodes, the results for 
middle-income countries are instead puzzling. The dummy variable associated with debt 
explosion is positive and often significant (the exception is the sub sample of low-income 
countries where the coefficients are not statistically significant). This indicates that, once 
valuation effects are controlled for, debt explosions are mostly driven by skeletons which 
are financed by issuing domestic debt. As expected, terms of trade shocks are positively 
correlated with the domestic debt share, indicating that an improvement in the terms of 
trade reduce the needs of external borrowing.
13 
12 This is in contrast with the results of Borensztein, Cowan, Eichengreen, and Panizza (2008) who find a 
close correlation between the development of the banking system and that of the domestic bond market.
13 Moreover, if countries are trying to stabilize their exchange rate, a positive term of trade shock and the 
associated current account surplus often translates into a net accumulation of international reserves and the 
12The effects of the two measures of openness differ across country groups. In low-
income countries, both trade openness and capital account openness have a negative effect 
on domestic debt share (but only trade openness is statistically significant). In middle-
income countries, instead, both openness variables are positively correlated with domestic 
debt share (although the coefficient of trade openness is almost zero and not even close to 
being statistically significant). These differential effects are consistent with the fact that in 
middle-income countries openness favors the entry of foreign investors, which is not the 
case in low-income countries.  We find that the exchange rate regime has no statistically 
significant effect on domestic debt share.
We can use the regional dummies to decompose regional differences in the share of 
domestic debt into a part that can be explained by our set of independent variables and an 
unexplained part. The results of this decomposition are somewhat surprising as they 
indicate that country characteristics do a very poor job at explaining regional differences in 
domestic debt shares.  In particular, we can use Table 4 to simulate what would happen to 
domestic debt share if each region had the same average country characteristics of the East 
Asia and Pacific region (we choose this region as a benchmark because it is the region that 
has made the biggest effort to develop the domestic bond market, see Eichengreen et al., 
2006).  We do this in Figure 3. The dark bars report the “raw” share of domestic debt (from 
Panel B of Table 3) and the light bars represent the simulated share (by construction the 
two bars have equal height in the EAP region). The only region in which country 
characteristics explain a substantial share of the regional difference is Sub Saharan Africa. 
In this case, the point estimates suggest that if countries in Sub Saharan Africa had the 
same characteristics as countries in East Asia, their share of domestic debt would increase 
by 4 percentage points, reducing the difference with East Asia by almost 50 per cent.  In all 
other cases, assuming the characteristics of the average East Asian country would lead to 
an increase in the difference between each region’s share of domestic debt and the share of 
domestic debt in East Asia. The most striking examples are Europe & Central Asia and 
Latin America & the Caribbean. Europe & Central Asia has a share of domestic debt which 
is slightly larger than that of East Asia & Pacific (38.9 per cent versus 37.3 per cent). 
However, if we were to assign to Europe & Central Asian countries the characteristics of 
the average East Asia & Pacific country, the share of domestic debt in Europe & Central 
Asia would drop by 8.5 percentage points and, at 30 per cent, would become much lower 
than that of East Asia.  In the case of Latin America & the Caribbean, the raw differential 
need to issue domestic securities in order to sterilize the liquidity created through reserve accumulation. 
13is almost 10 percentage points (37.3 per cent versus 27.8 per cent), but the simulated 
differential is close to 15 percentage points (37.3 per cent versus 22.5 per cent). This 
suggests that country characteristics (or at least, the ones that we are able to capture in our 
econometric model) do not seem to play a role in explaining the fact that Latin American & 
the Caribbean governments borrow abroad much more than East Asian & Pacific 
governments.
14        
Fixed effects estimations
Table 5 estimates a set of specifications similar to those of Table 4 by using a fixed effects 
model. While the random effects estimations can be interpreted as jointly capturing cross-
country and within-country differences, fixed effects estimations focus on within-country 
differences and, at the cost of a higher noise to signal ratio, allow to fully control for all 
time-invariant country-specific factors. Thus fixed effects estimates should be interpreted 
as an indication of whether within-country changes in country characteristics are associated 
with within-country changes in domestic debt share.
15   We find that the two estimation 
techniques yield similar results. The main difference is that we now find a much stronger 
effect of total GDP (statistically significant in 5 regressions and close to being significant 
in the sixth), indicating that GDP growth is positively associated with increases in 
domestic debt share (as we measure GDP in nominal US dollars, this may be due to 
valuation effects). We find that the effect of debt level is statistically significant and 
concave in all subsamples. In the case of low-income countries there are statistically 
significant domestic market-promoting effects of capital controls and budget deficits. 
Finally, we now find no significant relationship between trade openness and share of 
domestic debt. As before, we find that there is no statistically significant relationship 
between inflation and domestic debt share.  
In Table 6, we use STATA’s robust regression estimator to check whether or results 
are driven by outliers.
16 The main differences with respect to the estimations of Table 5 
concern the inflation, banking crisis, and openness variables. As before, we find that 
14 The coefficients of the regional dummies in column 2 of Table 4 are even larger, indicating that including 
more controls does not change the situation. 
15 In the fixed effect estimates we do not control for corruption and GDP per capita.  The first exclusion is 
due to the fact that we do not have annual data for corruption, the second exclusion is due to the fact that 
within country changes of GDP per capita are highly correlated with within country changes in total GDP.   
16  In particular, we use  rreg in STATA. This command estimates a robust regression using iteratively 
reweighed least squares. Extreme outliers with Cook's D greater than 1 are assigned a weight of zero. 
14inflation is rarely statistically significant (except for column 4), but we now find that in 
half of the cases the coefficient is positive, which is the opposite of what we expected. In 
the case of banking crises, we now find a negative and statistically significant coefficient in 
middle-income countries, indicating that countries with market access try to borrow abroad 
in order to finance the resolution of a banking crisis. This is the opposite of what we found 
in our random effects estimations. With respect to trade openness, we now find a positive 
coefficient in column 4 and a negative coefficient in column 3. We checked whether this 
difference in results is driven by the additional controls or by the smaller sample of column 
4 and find that the result is driven by the smaller sample and not by the presence of 
additional controls.  
3.2 Probing further
The results discussed above are surprising as they indicate that most of our independent 
variables have limited ability to explain cross-country and within country differences in 
domestic debt share.  However, the most puzzling finding is that we have not been able to 
identify a robust and statistically significant link between inflation and domestic debt 
share. In this section we explore possible reasons for this puzzling result.
One possible explanation for this finding is reverse causality (governments that put 
little weight on the cost of inflation may want to issue more domestic debt because this 
debt is easier to dilute with inflation). While we cannot directly test for this hypothesis 
because we do not have a good instrument for inflation, we suspect that the standard effect 
(i.e., limited demand for domestic debt instruments in presence of a history of high 
inflation) should dominate any effect that may drive a positive correlation between 
inflation and domestic debt share. In fact, all the papers surveyed in the introduction find 
that inflation has a negative effect on the development of the domestic bond market. 
Another possibility is multicollinearity. By including up to 18 controls in our model 
we may have been too ambitious in trying to separate different effects of macro stability. 
Inflation is correlated with several explanatory variables in our list and our regressions may 
not be powerful enough to capture the individual effects all of these variables.  In Table 7, 
we address this issue by using a more parsimonious set of controls and we still find the 
same results of inflation being positively (albeit, not significantly) correlated with domestic 
debt share and, again, we find that the only variables which are robustly correlated with 
domestic debt share are country size, level of debt, and currency depreciations.  Another 
15possibility is that inflation captures differences in domestic debt share across regions but 
not within regions. To check this hypothesis, we re-estimated Table 4 by dropping the 
regional dummies. Our basic results remain unchanged. We also found the same when we 
estimated the model by dropping year fixed effects. 
Another possibility is that by using annual data we are unable to capture the 
medium or long-term relationship between monetary credibility and domestic debt share. 
To address this issue, we re-estimate our panel regression using three-year averages instead 
of annual data but we still find that there is no statistically significant relationship between 
domestic debt share and inflation (Table 8). Next, we move to purely cross-sectional data 
and we find a negative and statistically significant relationship between inflation and 
domestic debt share when we compute averages for the 1990-2005 period, but we do not 
find any significant relationship between these variables when we examine any other sub 
period (Table 9).
Summing up, we find a significant relationship between inflation and domestic debt 
share only when we use cross-sectional data and averages over a 15 year period. Even in 
this case, we obtained the result only by dropping two outliers, if these two outliers are not 
excluded, the relationship between inflation and domestic debt share remains insignificant 
even in the 1990-2005 sample.
In the previous section, we mentioned that in presence of financial repression, the 
government could force domestic investors to buy government paper even if this yields a 
low real return. If this were the case, we should find a positive relationship between 
inflation and domestic debt share in countries with high levels of capital controls and a 
negative relationship between inflation and domestic debt share in countries with low 
levels of capital controls. We can test this hypothesis by substituting our continuous 
measure of capital controls with a discrete measure that takes the value of one in countries 
with high level of capital controls (we define all country-year with an index below 3 as 
having high capital controls; where 3 is the 33
rd percentile of the capital control index) and 
then interact this variable with inflation.
17 Formally, we estimate the following model:
i t i i t i t i t i t i t i t X HCC LINF HCC LINF DD , , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , ) * ( e n l g b a + + + + + = - - - - -
Where DD is domestic debt share, Ln(INF is log inflation, HCC is a dummy that takes 
17 We could have done the same using the continuous measure of capital controls but there results would 
have been more difficult to interpret. 
16value one in case of high capital controls, X is a matrix of other controls, n  is a set of 
random or fixed effects, and e  is the error term.  Within this setup, b measures the 
relationship between inflation and domestic debt share in countries that do not have a high 
level of capital controls, b+g  measures the relationship between inflation and domestic 
debt share in countries that have a high level of capital controls, andg   measures the 
difference between the relationship between inflation and domestic debt share in countries 
that have a high level of capital controls and the relationship between inflation and 
domestic debt share in countries that do not have a high level of capital controls. If our 
hypothesis is correct, we should find that b is negative and statistically significant and g  
is positive and, possibly, statistically significant.  Indeed, this is what we find in Table 10. 
The coefficient attached to inflation is always negative and is statistically significant in 5 
out of 6 regressions (with a p-value of 0.106, the coefficient is close to being statistically 
significant in the 6
th regression). As expected, the coefficients attached to the interaction 
term are always positive. Moreover, the coefficient is statistically significant in one 
regression (column 6) and close to being statistically significant in other three regressions 
(where the p-values of columns 1, 3, and 4 are 0.15, 0.14, and 0.13). The sum of the main 
and interacted effects (b+g ) ranges between -0.29 and 0.98, but this sum of coefficients 
in never statistically significant, indicating that there is no significant relationship between 
inflation and domestic debt share in countries with high capital controls. This evidence is 
consistent with the idea that our finding of no strong negative correlation between inflation 
and domestic debt share can be explained with the presence of capital controls and that 
inflation has a negative impact on the share of domestic debt in countries with low capital 
controls and no impact in countries with high capital controls.
4.  Conclusions
In this paper we use a new dataset on the composition of public debt in developing and 
emerging market countries to look at the correlation between country characteristics and 
domestic debt share.  We start by showing that there are large regional differences in the 
composition of public debt and then we check whether our regressions could help us in 
understanding the determinants of these differences. Even though we tried to control for a 
large set of variables, we found that our explanatory variables play almost no role in 
explaining regional differences. In fact, a simple simulation based on our regressions 
17shows that the "adjusted" regional differences are larger than the raw differences. Another 
surprising finding is that we do not find a strong correlation between inflationary history 
and domestic debt share. However, more careful investigation shows that this finding is 
due to the presence of capital controls. In countries with moderate or no capital controls 
there is a statistically significant negative correlation between domestic debt share and 
inflation. 
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20I.  Country Classifications
Regional Classifications
(In line with World Bank regional classifications)
EAP East Asia and Pacific
ECA Europe and Central Asia
LAC Latin America and the Caribbean
MNA Middle East and Northern Africa
SAS South Asia
SSA Sub Saharan Africa
The Income classification is the same as in the World Bank's World Development 
Indicators 
II. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1: Countries included in the Domestic Debt Dataset
YEAR EAP ECA LAC MNA SAS SSA Total
1990 10 2 23 5 7 20 67
1991 10 4 24 6 7 21 72
1992 11 7 25 6 7 21 77
1993 11 9 25 7 7 22 81
1994 11 11 25 7 7 24 85
1995 12 15 25 7 7 24 90
1996 13 16 26 7 7 25 94
1997 13 17 26 7 7 26 96
1998 14 21 26 7 7 28 103
1999 14 21 26 8 7 27 103
2000 13 22 26 9 7 27 104
2001 12 23 26 9 7 27 104
2002 12 23 26 9 7 26 103
2003 12 22 26 9 7 26 102
2004 12 21 26 9 7 25 100
2005 11 21 26 9 7 23 97
2006 9 19 22 6 4 7 67
2007 6 13 14 3 2 5 43
Total 206 287 443 130 118 404 1588
21Table 2: Public Debt Composition in Developing Countries
1994 1999 2005
DD/Y ED/Y TD/Y DD/TD DD/Y ED/Y TD/Y DD/TD DD/Y ED/Y TD/Y DD/TD
Simple Average
EAP 0.13 0.46 0.58 0.30 0.13 0.43 0.55 0.34 0.15 0.35 0.50 0.38
ECA 0.17 0.28 0.46 0.35 0.15 0.32 0.47 0.36 0.17 0.19 0.36 0.43
LAC 0.14 0.58 0.72 0.24 0.17 0.39 0.56 0.33 0.23 0.39 0.62 0.40
MNA 0.42 0.49 0.91 0.45 0.36 0.42 0.78 0.43 0.40 0.34 0.73 0.56
SAS 0.25 0.35 0.60 0.41 0.26 0.34 0.59 0.42 0.31 0.33 0.64 0.47
SSA 0.20 0.84 1.05 0.25 0.33 0.78 1.12 0.32 0.25 0.67 0.92 0.30
Total 0.19 0.55 0.75 0.30 0.22 0.47 0.69 0.35 0.23 0.40 0.64 0.40
Weighted Average
EAP 0.10 0.08 0.18 0.46 0.13 0.06 0.19 0.71 0.18 0.05 0.23 0.80
ECA 0.27 0.29 0.56 0.46 0.20 0.32 0.52 0.45 0.20 0.14 0.34 0.50
LAC 0.15 0.21 0.36 0.40 0.25 0.22 0.47 0.49 0.30 0.14 0.44 0.66
MNA 0.54 0.54 1.08 0.47 0.38 0.39 0.77 0.48 0.40 0.26 0.66 0.59
SAS 0.40 0.14 0.55 0.77 0.44 0.11 0.55 0.81 0.55 0.08 0.63 0.87
SSA 0.43 0.36 0.79 0.73 0.38 0.33 0.71 0.67 0.26 0.19 0.45 0.65
Total 0.22 0.21 0.43 0.48 0.24 0.19 0.43 0.59 0.27 0.11 0.39 0.69
The 1994 average covers 85 countries, the 1999 average covers 103 countries and the 2007 average covers 97 countries
Where DD = domestic debt; ED = external debt; TD = total debt; Y = year.
22Table 3: Summary Statistics: Domestic Debt/Total Debt
Group µ σ Median Min (%) Max N. of observations
Panel A: All observations
All Countries 31.93 24.56 27.48 0 100 1588
By Region
EAP 37.38 31.98 35.90 0 93.68     206
ECA 35.98 23.41 32.58 0 97.32 287
LAC 27.48 20.05 25.60 0 87.30 443
MNA 41.93 21.71 38.79 3.04 91.53 130
SAS 34.34 13.77 36.01 1.71 56.95 118
SSA 27.56 26.29 18.96 0 100 404
By Income Groups
Middle-income 37.29 24.88 34.50 0 98.39    1084
Low-income  20.37 19.34 15.96 0 100 504
By Period
1990-1995 27.04 23.87 22.12 0 98.39 472
1996-2000 32.02 24.21 27.54 0 100 504
2000-2006 35.03 24.73 30.60 0 100 572
Panel B: Observations included in the regressions
All Countries 32.30 24.45 28.18 0 100 1122
By Region
EAP 37.30 31.09 35.79 0 91.40 129
ECA 38.94 23.41 36.66 0 93.84 203
LAC 27.75 20.45 25.66 0 87.30 368
MNA 41.93 18.02 40.78 11.59 80.47 67
SAS 37.13 12.28 41.27 1.85 56.95 66
SSA 27.89 27.50 17.35 0 100 289
By Income Groups
Middle-income 37.60 24.59 35.57 0 98.39 798
Low-income  19.26 18.51 15.00 0 100 324
By Period
1990-1995 26.32 22.64 22.40 0 98.39            305
1996-2000 32.03 24.36      27.46 0 100 391
2000-2006 37.06 24.88 32.15 0 100 351
23III.  Estimation Results
Table 4: Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ALL developing count. Low-income Middle-income
Ln(INF)t-1 0.261 -0.492 -0.953 -2.441 0.545 -0.326
(0.44) (0.86) (0.67) (0.85) (0.68) (0.64)
CA/GDP t-1 2.299 13.788 1.187 58.849 9.586 19.712
(0.45) (0.95) (0.12) (1.05) (0.69) (1.18)
BANKCRIS t-1 -0.265 -0.235 -9.210 -6.205 0.322 0.399
(0.16) (0.17) (2.75)*** (0.72) (0.16) (0.25)
DEFAULT t-1 -0.595 0.462 -0.274 -0.166 -1.168 0.246
(0.29) (0.23) (0.07) (0.03) (0.46) (0.10)
M2/GDP t-1 6.918 4.797 77.762 95.388 1.860 4.444
(1.05) (0.91) (3.39)*** (2.26)** (0.29) (0.85)
Ln(GDP) t-1 0.042 0.040 0.210 -1.455 0.046 0.045
(3.90)*** (3.50)*** (1.41) (0.90) (5.14)*** (4.49)***
Ln(GDP_PC) t-1 8.155 14.119 12.311 9.792 5.438 18.925
(1.61) (2.28)** (2.12)** (1.44) (0.72) (2.43)**
DEBT/GDP t-1 6.939 19.907 -0.685 -40.939 14.356 22.734
(2.07)** (4.18)*** (0.08) (1.00) (2.67)*** (3.53)***
(DEBT/GDP)
2
 t-1 -1.061 -3.485 0.110 15.179 -2.843 -3.898
(2.25)** (3.13)*** (0.08) (1.26) (2.53)** (2.79)***
DRER -9.768 -6.312 -19.036 -21.668 -11.345 -6.187
(3.12)*** (1.37) (2.38)** (1.32) (2.34)** (1.20)
OPEN t-1 -0.026 -0.003 -0.213 -0.272 0.006 -0.002
(0.50) (0.04) (2.93)*** (2.32)** (0.09) (0.03)
CORR 8.704 6.509 -6.463 -21.255 11.779 3.995
(1.60) (0.99) (1.02) (0.99) (1.80)* (0.56)
DEBTCONTR -1.224 -1.564 9.257 10.501 -1.878 -2.652
(0.67) (0.80) (1.59) (1.12) (1.03) (1.42)
DEBTEXPL 4.692 5.715 4.103 4.332 4.191 4.015
(3.70)*** (4.02)*** (0.88) (0.41) (2.83)*** (2.80)***
FIX t-1 -1.403 5.820 -1.906
(0.91) (0.55) (1.14)
INT t-1 -1.656 3.312 -1.669
(1.20) (0.64) (1.10)
CAPCON t-1 0.677 -1.333 0.958
(1.93)* (1.07) (2.89)***
GBAL/GDP t-1 -0.240 -0.500 -0.056
(1.00) (0.52) (0.22)
TOT t-1 -0.023 0.379 -0.042
(0.41) (1.95)* (0.55)
RER_MIS t-1 -7.550 4.299 -5.772
(1.88)* (0.16) (1.70)*
ECA -6.779 -14.695 10.776 30.853 -17.454 -22.692
(0.80) (1.54) (1.82)* (2.30)** (1.65)* (2.46)**
LAC -14.804 -24.789 -15.960 6.467 -25.699 -31.842
(1.96)* (2.64)*** (1.60) (0.24) (2.90)*** (3.95)***
SAS 6.068 6.789 -7.767 69.313 -1.042 1.724
(0.80) (0.72) (1.00) (1.00) (0.11) (0.20)
SSA -3.247 -5.861 8.085 26.498 -14.435 -13.692
(0.39) (0.54) (1.43) (1.23) (1.12) (1.14)
MNA -5.544 -19.175 0.000 0.000 -15.812 -24.929
(0.52) (1.70)* (.) (.) (1.49) (2.62)***
Constant -36.257 -77.923 -81.036 -77.213 -9.020 -116.733
(0.91) (1.39) (1.73)* (1.33) (0.15) (1.67)*
Observations 1107 733 324 152 783 581
N. of countries 95 74 33 22 62 52
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust t-statistics in parentheses (standard errors are clustered at the country level)
***statistically significant at 1%, **statistically significant at 5%, *statistically significant at 10%
24Table 5: Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ALL developing count. Low-income Middle-income
Ln(INF)t-1 0.166 -0.589 -0.610 -0.747 0.440 -0.483
(0.38) (1.41) (1.25) (0.70) (0.71) (1.08)
CA/GDP t-1 2.683 8.675 -0.787 23.634 9.705 14.045
(0.73) (0.84) (0.22) (0.82) (1.17) (1.19)
BANKCRIS t-1 -0.438 -0.372 -2.325 -7.147 -0.044 0.238
(0.42) (0.30) (1.57) (2.02)** (0.03) (0.17)
DEFAULT t-1 -0.632 0.072 -0.828 -0.339 -0.898 0.388
(0.53) (0.06) (0.31) (0.10) (0.65) (0.29)
M2/GDP t-1 8.143 7.014 18.367 -12.613 3.919 8.602
(2.09)** (1.61) (1.77)* (0.58) (0.93) (1.95)*
Ln(GDP) t-1 0.040 0.040 1.150 0.849 0.043 0.047
(4.85)*** (4.86)*** (5.26)*** (1.43) (4.80)*** (5.44)***
DEBT/GDP t-1 5.527 18.129 7.738 44.977 12.227 20.107
(2.98)*** (6.05)*** (3.00)*** (3.52)*** (3.58)*** (5.10)***
(DEBT/GDP)
2
 t-1 -0.846 -3.087 -1.092 -12.781 -2.326 -3.212
(2.79)*** (4.57)*** (3.09)*** (3.45)*** (3.43)*** (4.18)***
DRER -9.637 -6.499 -9.524 8.188 -11.395 -7.169
(3.27)*** (1.51) (2.42)** (1.09) (2.80)*** (1.47)
OPEN t-1 0.003 0.048 -0.019 -0.095 0.031 0.053
(0.10) (1.18) (0.48) (1.15) (0.82) (1.20)
DEBTCONTR -0.883 -1.373 2.650 10.681 -1.411 -2.449
(0.51) (0.71) (0.57) (1.92)* (0.77) (1.28)
DEBTEXPL 4.737 5.787 6.259 16.037 4.170 4.260
(3.64)*** (3.81)*** (2.63)*** (4.53)*** (2.77)*** (2.67)***
FIX t-1 -0.833 -3.818 -0.681
(0.69) (1.29) (0.51)
INT t-1 -1.700 -2.583 -1.615
(1.95)* (1.08) (1.73)*
CAPCON t-1 0.786 -1.755 1.073
(2.90)*** (2.58)** (3.91)***
GBAL/GDP t-1 -0.187 -0.895 0.089
(1.09) (2.10)** (0.51)
TOT t-1 -0.003 -0.089 -0.004
(0.08) (1.71) (0.09)
RER_MIS t-1 -6.953 -32.437 -4.700
(2.28)** (3.52)*** (1.68)*
Constant 29.821 12.914 5.697 29.065 14.698 13.429
(7.82)*** (2.06)** (1.28) (1.97)* (2.92)*** (1.67)*
Observations 1122 734 324 152 798 582
N. of countries 97 74 33 22 64 52
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
***statistically significant at 1%, **statistically significant at 5%, *statistically significant at 10%
25Table 6: Fixed Effects. Robust Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ALL developing count. Low-income Middle-income
Ln(INF)t-1 0.006 -0.012 0.305 1.238 -0.302 -0.252
(0.02) (0.03) (1.15) (2.32)** (0.76) (0.53)
CA/GDP t-1 1.112 6.929 -2.811 -23.515 2.913 8.874
(0.33) (0.88) (1.24) (1.92)* (0.41) (0.96)
BANKCRIS t-1 -2.383 -1.733 -0.993 1.248 -2.616 -2.289
(2.76)*** (1.61) (1.04) (0.61) (2.37)** (1.86)*
DEFAULT t-1 0.543 -0.907 -3.348 -1.442 0.373 -0.948
(0.56) (0.81) (3.10)*** (0.92) (0.30) (0.72)
M2/GDP t-1 11.244 5.323 9.081 6.099 8.339 6.715
(3.73)*** (1.46) (1.76)* (0.53) (2.36)** (1.72)*
Ln(GDP) t-1 0.046 0.043 0.808 0.921 0.048 0.052
(6.17)*** (5.53)*** (6.55)*** (2.35)** (5.68)*** (6.14)***
DEBT/GDP t-1 3.289 14.069 3.378 11.034 12.116 19.683
(1.96)* (4.86)*** (2.68)*** (1.73)* (3.75)*** (5.46)***
(DEBT/GDP)
2
 t-1 -0.565 -2.777 -0.466 -4.454 -2.228 -3.301
(1.86)* (3.34)*** (2.19)** (2.21)** (2.44)** (3.52)***
DRER -4.311 -4.160 -0.902 3.417 -7.195 -8.496
(1.70)* (1.22) (0.42) (0.71) (1.97)** (2.03)**
OPEN t-1 0.001 0.066 -0.042 0.090 0.005 0.038
(0.04) (2.46)** (2.43)** (2.30)** (0.17) (1.18)
DEBTCONTR -2.296 -2.532 3.554 -2.540 -2.103 -3.225
(2.06)** (2.00)** (2.06)** (0.79) (1.61) (2.35)**
DEBTEXPL 3.693 4.872 1.683 7.127 3.857 3.480
(3.63)*** (4.15)*** (1.58) (3.69)*** (2.94)*** (2.59)***
FIX t-1 -0.949 2.072 -0.786
(0.94) (1.34) (0.65)
INT t-1 -1.221 0.216 -1.027
(1.62) (0.17) (1.23)
CAPCON t-1 0.515 -0.842 0.682
(2.58)** (1.97)* (3.12)***
GBAL/GDP t-1 -0.055 -0.025 0.014
(0.45) (0.15) (0.09)
TOT t-1 0.011 -0.012 0.038
(0.37) (0.36) (0.99)
RER_MIS t-1 -4.336 -9.505 -2.396
(2.41)** (1.96)* (1.21)
Constant -29.819 -20.462 -5.848 -32.662 -17.823 -32.098
(3.12)*** (2.94)*** (0.94) (1.47) (1.52) (3.04)***
Observations 1122 733 324 152 798 581
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
***statistically significant at 1%, **statistically significant at 5%, *statistically significant at 10%
26Table 7: Panel regressions with reduced set of controls
Random Effects Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (1) (2)
All developing count. Middle-income All developing count. Middle-income
Ln(INF)t-1 0.271 0.509 0.172 0.394
(0.47) (0.65) (0.40) (0.67)
CA/GDP t-1 3.097 7.668 2.552 8.248
(0.73) (0.64) (0.82) (1.14)
M2/GDP t-1 6.360 3.795 7.087 5.083
(0.98) (0.54) (1.89)* (1.23)
Ln(GDP) t-1 0.043 0.046 0.041 0.045
(4.43)*** (5.20)*** (5.16)*** (5.22)***
Ln(GDP_PC) t-1 9.882 8.032
(2.36)** (1.09)
DEBT/GDP t-1 6.268 12.677 4.555 11.062
(1.93)* (2.42)** (2.55)** (3.50)***
(DEBT/GDP)
2
 t-1 -0.963 -2.453 -0.697 -1.999
(2.08)** (2.25)** (2.49)** (3.31)***
 DRER -5.155 -8.491 -6.059 -9.489











Constant -51.699 -30.091 30.795 32.375
(1.45) (0.46) (10.94)*** (9.36)***
Observations 1130 796 1139 805
N. of countries 96 63 97 64
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
***statistically significant at 1%, **statistically significant at 5%, *statistically significant at 10%
27Table 8: Panel Estimations, 3-Year Averages
Random effects Fixed effects Fixed effects, Robust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Developing Countries
Ln(INF)t-1 1.043 -0.768 0.924 -0.601 -0.335 -0.843
(0.95) (0.67) (0.91) (0.55) (0.55) (0.99)
CA/GDP t-1 14.321 42.443 17.145 35.464 10.500 9.967
(1.27) (1.61) (1.74)* (1.40) (1.41) (0.63)
BANKCRIS t-1 -1.435 -1.513 -1.555 -1.501 -1.846 0.607
(0.82) (0.91) (0.88) (0.74) (1.32) (0.36)
DEFAULT t-1 0.512 1.537 0.611 1.543 1.021 -0.692
(0.24) (0.75) (0.32) (0.84) (0.68) (0.43)
M2/GDP t-1 4.654 5.150 4.255 3.887 11.535 4.751
(0.64) (0.82) (0.54) (0.54) (2.11)** (0.76)
Ln(GDP) t-1 0.058 0.049 0.062 0.052 0.056 0.050
(4.44)*** (3.75)*** (3.40)*** (3.11)*** (3.85)*** (3.22)***
Ln(GDP_PC) t-1 10.298 12.530
(2.03)** (1.97)**
DEBT/GDP t-1 8.516 18.575 8.216 20.954 7.756 19.184
(1.85)* (3.31)*** (1.81)* (3.93)*** (2.04)** (3.64)***
(DEBT/GDP)
2
 t-1 -1.737 -2.663 -1.636 -2.908 -1.411 -3.634
(1.80)* (2.13)** (1.64) (2.22)** (1.50) (2.29)**
DRER -11.123 -2.686 -9.977 -1.294 0.471 2.278
(1.88)* (0.39) (1.46) (0.18) (0.08) (0.31)
OPEN t-1 0.013 -0.038 0.080 0.052 0.022 0.134
(0.24) (0.61) (1.54) (0.72) (0.69) (2.85)***
CORR 6.760 8.616
(1.21) (1.20)
DEBTCONTR -1.225 -3.419 -0.334 -2.968 0.691 -0.797
(0.55) (1.55) (0.15) (1.33) (0.49) (0.51)
DEBTEXPL 3.682 1.833 4.018 2.023 3.831 3.311
(2.49)** (1.14) (2.70)*** (1.16) (3.25)*** (2.42)**
FIX t-1 -2.954 -1.750 -2.518
(0.92) (0.59) (1.12)
INT t-1 -2.815 -2.674 -2.003
(0.95) (1.10) (1.15)
CAPCON t-1 0.921 -0.079 0.062
(1.72)* (0.23) (0.25)
GBAL/GDP t-1 -0.261 1.278 1.338
(0.75) (2.39)** (3.76)***
TOT t-1 -0.006 -7.785 -6.522
(0.09) (1.94)* (2.05)**












Constant -58.996 -64.960 10.238 9.354 -5.609 -25.306
(1.46) (1.14) (1.79)* (0.98) (0.98) (1.35)
Observations 399 280 406 280 406 280
N. of countries 95 73 97 73 97 73
Period Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
***statistically significant at 1%, **statistically significant at 5%, *statistically significant at 10%
28Table 9: Cross country regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1990-2006 1990-95 1996-01 2002-06 1990-2006 1990-95 1996-01 2002-06
Ln(INF) -1.968 -7.191 3.672 -4.165 -4.725 -1.367 -5.843 1.498 -3.359 -5.399
(0.67) (2.18)** (0.99) (1.16) (1.11) (0.55) (2.01)** (0.48) (0.95) (1.35)
CA/GDP  3.504 22.478 139.594 50.531 78.074 21.223 24.647 115.414 63.161 84.738
(0.10) (0.46) (1.72)* (0.98) (1.42) (0.63) (0.52) (1.50) (1.21) (1.81)*
DEFAULT 1.491 -3.356 7.406 -5.851 -6.779 -3.052 -4.606 1.125 -4.397 -6.333
(0.30) (0.63) (0.83) (0.95) (0.86) (0.67) (0.92) (0.15) (0.67) (0.81)
M2/GDP t 20.154 15.697 27.098 22.143 2.588 14.934 6.034 39.154 6.658 -2.423
(2.84)*** (1.94)* (1.19) (2.34)** (0.38) (2.35)** (0.82) (1.81)* (0.76) (0.40)
Ln(GDP) t 0.028 0.033 0.070 0.027 0.016 0.034 0.038 0.102 0.040 0.022
(1.70)* (1.91)* (1.28) (1.27) (1.26) (2.14)** (2.34)** (1.86)* (1.99)* (1.91)*
Ln(GDP_PC)  11.980 16.701 17.460 12.288 14.726 7.334 8.685 10.652 2.620 7.255
(2.54)** (2.95)*** (1.78)* (1.93)* (2.21)** (1.73)* (1.68)* (1.30) (0.45) (1.33)
DEBT/GDP  3.548 -2.919 -16.419 -4.916 6.452 7.215 2.001 -19.658 -4.084 9.312
(0.28) (0.21) (0.95) (0.25) (0.28) (0.60) (0.15) (1.24) (0.20) (0.40)
(DEBT/GDP)
2
  -0.888 0.182 2.720 2.025 -2.761 -2.447 -1.730 2.825 1.672 -3.752
(0.25) (0.05) (0.96) (0.27) (0.26) (0.71) (0.46) (1.03) (0.21) (0.35)
OPEN  -0.120 -0.090 0.093 -0.063 -0.103 -0.075 -0.025 0.096 0.009 -0.053
(1.67)* (1.13) (0.67) (0.73) (1.23) (1.11) (0.33) (0.75) (0.11) (0.75)
CORR 3.041 -2.747 -8.557 1.234 3.382 3.919 2.179 -7.773 5.975 8.459
(0.59) (0.45) (1.02) (0.17) (0.44) (0.78) (0.37) (0.96) (0.84) (1.28)
FIX  -17.768 -3.213 -10.906 -11.037 -11.244 1.186 -8.716 -10.62
(2.16)** (0.29) (1.25) (1.43) (1.43) (0.11) (1.05) (1.49)
INT  2.998 -14.364 2.519 -5.777 -0.417 -10.712 0.722 -8.060
(0.24) (0.99) (0.22) (0.59) (0.03) (0.74) (0.06) (0.88)
CAPCON  0.446 -2.045 0.720 0.116 -0.535 -2.459 -0.244 -0.600
(0.50) (1.28) (0.79) (0.12) (0.66) (1.74)* (0.29) (0.71)
GBAL/GDP  -2.739 -2.345 -3.024 -2.454 -2.284 -2.204 -1.944 -2.029
(2.88)*** (2.03)* (2.57)** (2.21)** (2.44)** (2.07)** (1.73)* (1.88)*
ECA 0.397 -3.177 -32.436 -5.763 -10.922
(0.05) (0.29) (2.02)* (0.49) (0.92)
LAC -13.973 -13.179 -32.664 -15.780 -15.202
(1.70)* (1.23) (2.40)** (1.39) (1.27)
SAS 5.557 -5.814 -10.246 1.860 -5.131
(0.47) (0.42) (0.60) (0.10) (0.32)
SSA 2.722 11.521 -24.030 9.095 3.079
(0.36) (1.08) (1.65) (0.76) (0.25)
MNA -12.599 -19.172 -28.401 -41.357 -22.931
(1.22) (1.62) (1.86)* (2.55)** (1.54)
CONST -58.734 -84.046 -104.43 -60.227 -61.453 -25.721 -21.761 -71.003 19.301 -2.105
(1.41) (1.74)* (1.32) (1.11) (1.02) (0.69) (0.50) (1.10) (0.39) (0.04)
Observations 102 84 48 77 78 102 84 48 77 78
R-squared 0.38 0.50 0.58 0.45 0.46 0.31 0.41 0.47 0.31 0.40
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
***statistically significant at 1%, **statistically significant at 5%, *statistically significant at 10%
29Table 10: Interactions between capital controls and inflation 
Random Effects Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All developing 
countries
Middle-income Low-income All developing 
count.
Middle-income Low-income
Ln(INF)t-1 -1.279 -1.117 -5.744 -1.325 -1.227 -3.994
(2.07)** (1.65)* (1.61) (2.15)** (1.86)* (2.26)**
Ln(INF)t-1* HCAPCON t-1 0.994 0.738 5.412 1.005 0.850 4.967
(1.43) (0.90) (1.45) (1.50) (1.11) (2.81)***
CA/GDP t-1 9.863 11.211 79.045 7.197 11.795 15.261
(0.98) (0.96) (3.29)*** (0.68) (0.96) (0.52)
BANKCRIS t-1 -0.768 -0.130 -4.236 -0.850 -0.077 -2.229
(0.64) (0.10) (0.61) (0.69) (0.06) (0.68)
DEFAULT t-1 0.037 -0.384 -0.905 0.092 0.305 -0.196
(0.03) (0.26) (0.25) (0.07) (0.23) (0.06)
M2/GDP t-1 8.496 6.966 38.238 6.699 8.239 -23.051
(1.98)** (1.52) (1.71)* (1.54) (1.87)* (1.08)
Ln(GDP) t-1 0.044 0.048 -0.161 0.039 0.046 0.949
(7.24)*** (7.68)*** (0.52) (4.94)*** (5.35)*** (1.54)
FIX t-1 -0.940 -1.469 2.438 -0.539 -0.340 -3.299
(0.73) (0.93) (0.51) (0.44) (0.25) (1.14)
INT t-1 -1.479 -1.426 -2.484 -1.430 -1.244 -3.041
(1.66)* (1.44) (0.58) (1.60) (1.29) (1.22)
GBAL/GDP t-1 -0.267 -0.121 -0.709 -0.234 0.013 -0.813
(1.57) (0.64) (1.31) (1.33) (0.07) (1.97)*
DEBT/GDP t-1 12.871 14.395 -48.880 15.867 18.034 35.893
(4.10)*** (3.53)*** (2.29)** (5.19)*** (4.54)*** (2.84)***
(DEBT/GDP)
2
 t-1 -2.331 -2.788 18.351 -2.805 -2.967 -9.246
(3.37)*** (3.24)*** (2.57)** (3.95)*** (3.79)*** (2.39)**
DRER -8.305 -8.211 -35.991 -7.046 -7.854 3.514
(2.00)** (1.67)* (2.40)** (1.63) (1.57) (0.47)
HCAPCON t-1 -2.717 -3.277 -7.809 -2.754 -3.764 1.535
(1.33) (1.36) (0.93) (1.36) (1.54) (0.51)
RER_MIS t-1 -5.720 -4.048 27.058 -6.506 -4.358 -25.551
(1.99)** (1.50) (1.61) (2.08)** (1.48) (3.06)***
TOT t-1 -0.016 -0.017 0.309 -0.005 -0.002 -0.069
(0.44) (0.35) (2.94)*** (0.14) (0.04) (1.41)
OPEN t-1 0.029 0.044 -0.196 0.044 0.043 -0.089
(0.83) (1.23) (2.99)*** (1.08) (0.95) (1.13)
DEBTCONTR -1.059 -2.205 14.407 -0.875 -1.804 10.016
(0.57) (1.15) (2.33)** (0.46) (0.95) (1.79)*
DEBTEXPL 5.543 4.190 4.447 5.688 4.283 14.361
(3.64)*** (2.40)** (0.49) (3.66)*** (2.60)*** (3.99)***
Constant 19.112 22.959 26.412 18.203 20.428 7.935
(2.90)*** (2.80)*** (1.64) (2.97)*** (2.56)** (0.66)
Observations 734 582 152 734 582 152
N. of countries 74 52 22 74 52 22
R-squared 0.29 0.30 0.57
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
***statistically significant at 1%, **statistically significant at 5%, *statistically significant at 10%




























The number of countries included in the average ranges between 67 (2006) and 104 (2000-2001). 







































Simple averages vary in terms of country coverage, with the years 1994, 1999, and 2005 including 85, 103 and 97 countries 
respectively. 
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